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This study investigates what factors are associated with the 
likelihood of passing school facility construction bonds by local 
district election. It uses statewide data from Michigan, 1998–
2006, to examine the outcome of 789 bond elections in terms of 
ten variables: amount of the bond request; district enrollment; 
district locale; percentage of students receiving free school 
lunches; percentage of the district population with only a high 
school degree; the district’s long-term debt; voter turnout; the day 
of the calendar year on which the election is held; the number of 
the bond proposal on the ballot; and the inclusion of technology 
in the ballot proposal’s wording. The logistic regression analysis 
finds that bond amount, percentage of students receiving free 
lunches, percentage of district population with only a high school 
degree, voter turnout, and being further down on the ballot are all 
negative and significant factors. District long-term debt and 
holding the election later in the calendar year are both positive 
and significant factors. District enrollment numbers are non-
significant. In terms of district locale (using mid-sized 
city/suburban districts as the reference group), being a small town 
and rural district is a negative and significant factor. 
 




Every year school districts across the U.S. bring before their local 
voters requests for money to build new or upgrade existing school 
facilities. Funds to pay for capital-improvement projects are 
usually raised through school bonds—borrowing money that is 
paid back at interest over time with increased local property taxes 
approved by voters. In this longstanding system for building and 
maintaining educational capital infrastructure, today’s new school 
building projects become tomorrow’s long-term debt. Districts 
that cannot secure funding from their voters for up-to-date capital 
improvements may fall behind more successful neighboring 
districts in providing quality teaching and learning conditions. 
This can be potentially damning in regions where high-stakes 
accountability puts school districts in a results-driven race and 
school-choice competition empowers families to move their 
students into whichever nearby district looks to be doing the best. 
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Given that adequate capital facilities are a very publically visible 
component in this equation, school district leaders need to find 
strategies for convincing local voters to approve bond requests. 
However, do different types of districts experience different 
chances? What really matters when it comes to getting school 
bond elections passed? 
 
Despite the importance of school bond passage to U.S. school 
districts, the area is surprisingly under-researched by scholars. To 
explain what influences the likelihood of passing or failing school 
bond elections, this study builds on prior work (Bowers, Metzger 
and Militello, 2010) looking at the context of one particular state 
over an expanded span of time: Michigan, 1998–2006. Our 
purpose is to investigate variables suggested by a review of the 
limited prior research available to test a model of the likelihood 
of a bond request getting passed. We examine the following ten 
variables: amount of the bond request; district enrollment; district 
locale; percentage of students receiving free school lunches; 
percentage of the district population with a high school degree; 
the district’s long-term debt; voter turnout; the day of the calendar 
year on which the election is held; the number of the bond 
proposal on the ballot; and the inclusion of technology in the 
ballot proposal’s wording. 
 
Michigan is of wider interest because it is representative of 
Midwestern states that have experienced an economic downturn 
in the post-industrial U.S. economy over the past several decades. 
Looking at Michigan (which had a total of 568 public school 
districts in 2006) may illuminate the tensions and problems that 
similar states with a declining population and industrial base may 
also face in funding local educational infrastructure. Our study is 
novel because it examines all capital facilities bond elections for 
an entire state over nearly a full decade – an approach rarely 
taken in the past. Rather than depending on decades-old research, 
non-empirical or unpublished dissertations, a thin sliver of time, 
or narrow set of variables, our study aims to take into 
consideration past scholarship in building and testing a new 
model that can inform emerging theory on school facilities bond 
passage. 
 
Previous Research on School Capital Expenditure Bond Requests 
 
Historically, U.S. school districts have financed capital 
improvements through local bond elections (Duncombe, and 
Wang, 2009; Sielke, Dayton, Holmes, and Jefferson 2001). 
Hence, understanding why bond requests are passed or rejected is 
an urgent issue for school district leaders, local communities, and 
educational researchers. Studies of school capital expenditure 
outcomes have conceptual roots in theories of public choice. 
More prevalent are normative models that emerged from both the 
theories of public choice and from data on capital expenditure 
elections. Both public choice theory and the derived normative 
models help researchers to identify variables for empirical 
studies. 
 
Public choice theory (Mueller, 2003) has identified multiple 
factors that influence voter choice, including the “rational actor” 
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model, self-interest (Brodsky and Thompson 1993; Piele and Hall 
1973b; Sanders 1988; Shabman and Stephenson 1994), trust in 
public officials (Olsen 1965), and loyalty (Berkman and Plutzer 
2004). Often these factors compete with one another. For 
example, Berkman and Plutzer (2004) found that “loyalty—an 
emotional bond between residents and their community’s 
institutions—competes with and often trumps instrumental self 
interest” (p. 1178). Together, from the economics research 
perspective, public choice theory has focused on modeling 
individual voter behaviors and the effects on bond elections 
(Balsdon, Brunner, and Rueben 2003). Another equally 
interesting strand of research has focused on modeling the factors 
associated with bond election outcome. This research can be 
classified into two main categories, normative and empirical 
models of bond passage. 
 
Normative models have emerged as a bridge between pubic 
choice theory and the pragmatic need to develop specific 
strategies to enable districts to successfully pass school bonds for 
capital improvements. In reviewing available studies (Boschee 
2003; Boschee and Holt 1999; Conrad 2002; Crader, Holloway, 
and Stauffacher 2002; Davis and Tyson 2003; Holt 2002; Johnson 
2008; Lifto and Senden 2006; Nagardeolekar and Merritt 2006), a 
range of commonalities emerge in the prescriptive findings: clear 
and compelling vision and ballot language; convincing the public 
the cost and design are the most appropriate alternative; 
community education, communication, and involvement in the 
process; support from the board of education and other 
governmental agencies; get out the “yes” vote, especially among 
parents and senior citizens; and obtain advice from school 
districts that had previously won bond elections. 
 
While procedural advice for school officials is plentiful, empirical 
literature on exactly what factors are associated with the 
likelihood of passing a bond remains sparse. Some studies focus 
on estimating overall expenditures. As one example from the 
more general municipal funding literature, Bradbury, Ladd, 
Perrault, Reschovsky, and Yinger (1984) examined the predictors 
of municipal operating expenditures, including schools, in 
Massachusetts in 1980 and found that significant predictors 
included the size of the city, the amounts of crime and poverty, 
overall revenue, residential income, and student enrollment in 
local schools. Though schools were only one type of municipal 
expenditure in their study, their findings highlight multiple 
factors that other studies specifically focused on schools and 
school bonds have also found are important in determining the 
likelihood of funding requests for school capital expenditures.  
 
The most influential and in-depth review of factors that related to 
school bond passage was conducted several decades ago by Piele 
and Hall (1973a; 1973b). Their meta-analysis generated “partial 
theories” of factors that impact bond election outcomes: school 
district characteristics (e.g., property assessment, student-to-
teacher ratio, amount of bond, per pupil expenditure); election 
characteristics (e.g., time of year, past voting patterns, turnout, 
purpose of the issue); voter demographic characteristics (e.g., 
income, SES, education, home ownership, age, child status, 
gender); voter psychological characteristics (e.g., cynicism, 
educational attitudes, civic improvement orientation); information 
factors (e.g., source of information, use of citizen advisory 
committees, campaign techniques, media support); political 
characteristics (e.g., interest group activity, school-community 
relationships). 
 
More specifically, Piele and Hall (1973a) found that while the 
overall size of a school district did not appear to affect the 
outcome of an election, increased overall voter turnout decreased 
the chances of passing a school bond. The authors state, 
“Although the use of these ‘get out the vote’ techniques 
represents an admirable faith in the ‘democratic model,’ they may 
well cause a new increase in negative voting” (1973a, p. 87). 
They also found that the time of year and purpose of the bond did 
not significantly factor into the outcome while voter income and 
voter educational level did. In the end, Piele and Hall describe the 
characteristics of voters most likely to vote in favor of school 
financial election as young parents of school age children that 
have a high level of education and income. Surprisingly, few 
studies since the 1970s have focused on modeling the factors 
associated with the likelihood of school bond elections passing or 
failing. 
 
Recent studies on capital expenditure elections have varied, both 
in methodological approach and the subsequent findings. Holt, 
Wendt, and Smith (2006) found that the establishment of a 
diverse community task force and the dissemination of 
information regarding benefits to children and the community had 
a profound impact on the campaign. Two studies found self-
interest (currently having children in school) did not impact 
voting (Priest and Fox 2005) and election outcomes (Browkaw, 
Gale, and Merz 1990). However, these same studies found that 
trust in local school officials is important (Browkaw, Gale, and 
Merz 1990; Priest and Fox 2005). Finally, Berkman and Plutzer 
(2004) found that the impact of elderly voters mattered in 
educational expenditures in that concentrations of long-time 
elderly residents supported educational expenditures across 9000 
districts while recent arrivals did not. 
 
Current research has also used logistic or probit regression 
methods to estimate the parameters that are significant in 
modeling school district bond passage. Findings about specific 
significant parameters have been mixed, sometimes confirming 
and other times conflicting with each other. Sielke (1998) 
examined all proposed school bonds in Michigan between 
January and November, 1995, and found that a school district’s 
current debt load and the general socio-economic status (SES) of 
the district were significant in predicting bond passage. 
Interestingly, while the SES finding replicated Piele and Hall 
(1973a) as a positive predictor, the amount of school debt was 
also a positive predictor. Specifically, school districts with high 
amounts of debt were more likely to pass additional bonds. The 
amount of the bond and the number of election attempts were 
non-significant (Sielke 1998). In contrast, Beckham and Maiden 
(2003) examined all bond proposals in Oklahoma from 1995 
through 2000 and found that amount of the bond was significant: 
as the amount of the bond increased, passage rates decreased. 
They also identified the inclusion of technology in the wording of 
the bond proposal as a significant positive predictor of passage 
rates, and confirmed Sielke’s (1998) findings that district 
enrollment generally was not a significant predictor (Beckham 
and Maiden 2003). Furthermore, while Sielke (1998) did not 
report an R2 statistic, Beckham and Maiden (2003) reported that 
their model accounted for approximately 10% of the variance in 
bond passage rates. 
 
Following the findings from Sielke (1998), Zimmer and Jones 
(2005) used the district as the unit of analysis and modeled the 
successful issuance of bonds across 140 school districts in 
Michigan between 1991 and 1998. They found that previous 
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district debt as well as if a district was either rural or town were 
significant in their model. More debt was positively related to 
districts issuing a bond, while rural and town locations were 
negatively related to bond issuance. The authors stated that their 
findings indicate that “voters in more leveraged school districts 
have greater tastes for debt… [and that] voters in more rural areas 
are less likely to vote favorably in bond referenda as compared to 
large cities and suburbs” (Zimmer and Jones, 2005, p.541). This 
is in comparison to the non-significant variables included in their 
model, including resident’s income, property value per pupil, 
enrollment growth rate, percent population ages 5-19 and 65 or 
older, and the county unemployment rate. 
 
More recently, Bowers, Metzger and Militello (2010) analyzed all 
proposed qualified school capital finance bonds in Michigan 
between 2000 and 2005 and reported four main findings. First, 
confirming Beckham and Maiden (2003), they found that as the 
amount of the bond increased the odds of the bond passing 
decreased. Second, in contrast to both Sielke (1998) and 
Beckham and Maiden (2003), district enrollment was a 
significant predictor of bond passage: as enrollment increased the 
odds of passing the bond also increased. Third, district locale was 
a significant parameter associated with bond passage. While mid-
sized city and suburban school districts had relatively high overall 
chances of passing a bond, controlling for the other variables, 
rural school districts passed bonds at a much lower rate and small 
town school districts experienced the worst chances of all. Fourth, 
as the focus of the study, a district’s chances of passing a bond 
were highest on the first attempt, with decreasing odds for 
subsequent “re-floats” of the same bond proposal. In the end, the 
model explained approximately 10% of the variance in bond 
passage rates in the Michigan case—comparable to Beckham and 
Maiden (2003) in Oklahoma. 
 
Overall, these studies present a conflicting and fragmented model 
of the likelihood of passing a school bond. In order to build a 
coherent and updated research base, future studies should expand 
on the key issues tested in the earlier work. Relying on this 
previous literature, we identify seven major types of variables that 
have been tested in the past and need to be examined further for 
contemporary contexts in a single combined study to model the 
associated effects of each variable, while controlling for the 
others, using a recent and large dataset. 
 
 SES and education levels of the community (Bradbury, Ladd, 
Perrault, Reschovsky, and Yinger 1984, Piele and Hall 
1973a): Are the percentages of students in poverty in a district 
or the district’s overall education levels associated with bond 
election outcome? 
 Debt-load parameters (Sielke, 1998; Zimmer and Jones, 
2005): Is the district’s overall long-term debt a significant 
predictor of bond election outcomes?  
 Technology (Beckham and Maiden 2003): Is the inclusion of 
wording to fund technology improvements in a bond proposal 
associated with the outcome of bond elections? 
 Bond amount (Bowers, Metzger and Militello 2010; Beckham 
and Maiden 2003; Sielke 1998): Is the amount of money 
requested in the bond associated with the outcome of bond 
elections? 
 Number of bond attempts and locale (Bowers, Metzger and 
Militello 2010, Sielke 1998): Do the number of “floats” or 
district type predict the outcome of bond elections? 
 District enrollment (Bowers, Metzger and Militello 2010; 
Beckham and Maiden 2003; Piele and Hall 1973a; Sielke 
1998): Is student enrollment associated with the outcome of 
bond elections? 
 Voter turnout (Piele and Hall, 1973a): To what extent is voter 
turnout associated with the outcome of bond elections? 
 
Furthermore, we suggest new variables that have received little 
attention since the 1970s: 
 
 Day of year and proposal number on the ballot (Piele and 
Hall 1973a). Is the proposal’s position on the ballot or when it 
is held during the year associated with the outcome of bond 
elections? Is it best for a capital request to appear as the first 
or only issue or to be listed among many funding requests on 
an election ballot? 
 
METHOD 
Our research was conducted by examining publicly available data 
on all qualified school bond loans (QSBL) in the state of 
Michigan for school capital improvements from 1998 through 
2006, obtained from the Michigan Department of Treasury 
(Michigan Department of Treasury, n.d.). For details on 
Michigan’s QSBL program, see Militello, Metzger and Bowers 
(2008) and Sielke et al. (2001). This resulted in 793 bond 
elections state-wide for the period, of which 394 passed (49.7%) 
and 399 failed (50.3%). However, only 789 bonds contained full 
data records (hence, for our study n=789). Variables obtained 
from the database for each bond included district name, election 
date, bond amount, votes yes, votes no, if the bond passed or 
failed, ballot number, and the complete text of each ballot as it 
was presented to voters. 
 
To replicate and extend past research on the variables associated 
with passing or failing school bond elections, we then merged this 
bond database with the U.S. Department of Education/NCES 
Common Core of Data (CCD) (NCES, n.d.) for all districts that 
put a qualified bond up for election in Michigan, 1998-2006. 
District-level variables included district locale, total student 
enrollment each year, percent of students receiving free lunch, 
percent of local population with a high school diploma, percent of 
local voter turnout for the bond election, election day of the year, 
total amount of district long-term debt, and bond wording for 
technology. We constructed categories of school district locale 
using the locale codes from the National Center for Education 
Statistics (NCES), which are derived from the 2000 U.S. census 
designations. In our study, the mid-sized city-suburban category 
includes the urban core of mid-sized cities and the urban fringe of 
mid-sized and large cities. Our categories small town and rural 
are unchanged from the NCES locale codes. However, the 
Michigan Treasury database of bonds used for this research 
excluded large cities, such as Detroit, putting the large urban 
context beyond the scope of this study. 
 
The remaining variables were constructed within the limitations 
of the data from the Michigan Treasury and the NCES CCD. 
Percent free lunch students is the percentage of enrolled students 
receiving subsidized free lunches. While “free and reduced price 
lunch students” would be preferable as a measure of 
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Table 1: Michigan School District Bonds 1998-2006 by Locale, Number of Floats and Percent Pass. 
 
         
 First Float Second Float Third Float All Floats 
 Total % Pass Total % Pass Total % Pass Total % Pass 
Mid-Sized City 37 45.9 3 66.7 1 100.0 41 48.8 
Suburban 253 64.0a 15 33.3 4 100.0 272 62.9 e 
Small Town 83 42.2 14 07.1 b 3 066.6 100 38.0 f 
Rural 312 46.7 49 24.5 c 15 033.3 376 43.1 g 
All Districts 685 52.4 81 24.7 d 23 052.2 789 49.6 
 
a - χ2(1, N = 253) = 18.82, p<0.005; b - χ2(1, N = 14) = 10.28, p<0.005; c - χ2(1, N = 49) = 12.76, p<0.005; d - χ2(1, N = 81) = 20.75, 
p<0.005; e - χ2(1, N = 272) = 18.01,p<0.005; f - χ2(1, N = 100) = 5.76, p<0.05; g - χ2(1, N = 376) = 7.19, p< 0.01 
 
free lunch students were available from the CCD going back to 
1998. Percent population with high school diploma was 
calculated using data from the 2000 U.S. census, dividing the 
total number of residents reporting having obtained only a high 
school diploma by the total number of residents age 18 or older 
and multiplying by 100. This measure of educational attainment 
was used rather than “some college” due to the CCD listing only 
high school diploma, associate degrees and all college degrees. 
Percent voter turnout was calculated by dividing the total number 
of voters recorded for each bond election by the total number of 
residents age 18 or older in the 2000 U.S. census. While not a 
pure measure of voter turnout, this calculation is a reasonable  
proxy given the data available. Election day of the year is simply 
the number of the day of the year, from 1 to 365, reported for 
when the bond election was held (e.g., 42 corresponds to 
February 11). Proposal ballot number refers to the position of the 
bond on the election ballot reported to the state. However, the 
total number of issues on the ballot was not reported. Thus, 
position number indicates only relative position, not whether a 
bond is one among many issues on a ballot.  District long-term 
debt is the total amount (in millions of dollars) reported at the 
start of the fiscal year for that school district and, thus, contains 
previous capital expenditures still being paid. To test previous 
hypotheses about the influence of the wording of bonds 
(Beckham and Maiden, 2003), the text of each ballot was coded 
as 0 or 1 for the absence or presence of wording pertaining to 
technology (including funding requests for computers, 
networking, and technology upgrades). 
 
Furthermore, our analysis includes the number of reported 
election floats for the bond. A consistent strategy for school 
districts nationwide has been to “refloat” or “try again” to pass a 
bond that was previously rejected by voters (Bowers, Metzger 
and Militello 2010; Johnson 2008). Each bond was considered a 
separate case in the dataset. If a bond failed and was put back up 
for election within 12 months with substantively the same 
funding request and language, the bond was coded as a second 
float. Bonds were coded as third floats if the second float failed 
and the district put the bond back up again within another 12 
months. As recommended for conditional datasets (Singer and 
Willet, 2003), a bond could not be considered for a second or 
third float unless it failed on the first or second float (a second or 
third float bond is conditional on the pass/fail status of the bond 
that preceded it). Of the 789 bonds in our sample, 685 were first 
floats; 326 of them failed. Of the first floats that failed, 81 were 
floated a second time; 61 failed. Of the second float bonds that 
failed, 23 were floated a third time; 11 failed. As recommended 
for conditional dependent data of this type, discrete-time hazard 
modeling using logistic regression was employed to estimate the 
probability of a district passing a school facilities bond (Bowers, 
Metzger and Militello, 2010). (For a more in-depth review of 
discrete-time hazard modeling, see Singer and Willet, 2003). In 
our analysis, bonds were coded as either having passed or failed 
an election, and a logistic regression was calculated with bond 
passage as the estimated outcome—where the float of each bond 
(a discrete time point) represents a pseudo-intercept conditional 
upon the previous float failing: 
 
Logit(Y)   = α First Float X First Float + α Second Float X Second Float + α Third 
Float X Third Float + β1X1+ β2X2 + β3X3 …  
 
To aid in model interpretation, estimated probabilities were 
generated for each bond by converting the logit estimates into 
probabilities (1/(1+e-logit)) and fitted lines were plotted for the 
different district locale categories in the dataset against the data 
for each of the district-level and bond-level variables included in 
the final logistic regression model.  
 
 
RESULTS AND ANLYSIS 
In this section, we report the findings of our analysis of school 
bond data from across the state of Michigan from 1998–2006 
(n=789). Our purpose is to identify important differences in the 
rates of school bond elections passing or failing based on the 
variables explained above. In addition, we hope to articulate an 
expanded model of bond passage that contributes to the research 
base on capital bond election outcomes. Research over the past 20 
years has identified multiple variables associated with passing or 
failing school facilities bonds. While many of these variables are 
statistically significant in the previous models, they have 
explained only about 10% of the variance in bond passage rates. 
In addition, few studies have examined all bonds for multiple 
years across an entire state-wide context. Our aim is to test an 
expanded model of school facilities bond passage that controls for 
the conditional nature of the data resulting from the practice of 
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Table 2: Michigan School District Bond Means and Standard Deviations, 1998-2006 
 
         
 Passed (SD)  Failed (SD)  Total (SD) 
Bond Amount (in Millions $) 23.491 (29.303)  22.7636 (38.951)  23.175 (34.448) 
Enrollment (in Thousands) 3.327 (3.743)  2.614 (2.883)  2.973 (3.355) 
Bond $ per Enrolled Student 7961.190 (6100.330)  9392.535 (8670.589)  8692.126 (7534.623) 
Percent Free Lunch Students 18.557 (12.492)  22.516 (11.848)  20.555 (12.315) 
Percent Pop. with H.S. Degree 30.715 (7.574)  33.466 (5.993)  32.109 (6.952) 
Long Term Debt (in Millions $) 25.129 (40.465)  10.543 (22.179)  17.750 (33.328) 
Percent Voter Turnout 22.403 (11.305)  26.757 (9.033)  24.521 (10.514) 
Election Day of the Year 201.790 (82.834)  181.660 (86.361)  191.860 (85.158) 
Ballot Number 1.19 (0.542)  1.47 (0.893)  1.330 (0.752) 
         
         
Floats 
 
Bringing a previously rejected bond request before local voters a 
second or third time is far from an uncommon practice in the case 
of Michigan. If voters said no, why not try again? However, the 
actual frequencies over the period 1998-2006 are interesting, as 
shown in table 1.  
 
Overall, 52.4% of first-time bond requests passed. Only 24.7% of 
second floats passed. While third floats were, overall, a small 
sample, curiously they appeared to pass at nearly the same rate as 
first floats (52.2%). When we bring district locale (mid-sized 
city/suburban, small town, and rural) into the picture, the results 
extend previous findings about Michigan school bonds (Bowers, 
Metzger and Militello, 2010). The initial bond request has 
relatively high chances of passing for all types of school districts, 
though this is most pronounced for suburban districts. Second 
floats have precipitously lower chances, though it does appear 
that chances may rise on a third attempt. However, does district 
locale tell us anything about the chances of passing a school bond 
in Michigan during this time period when we control for other 
variables that have been shown in previous literature to 
significantly predict bond election outcomes? Addressing this 
question requires a deeper look. 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Michigan School Bonds, 1998-2006 
 
Table 2 presents overall means and standard deviations for each 
variable, disaggregated by passed and failed bonds. 
 
These descriptive statistics suggest important differences between 
districts with school bond elections that pass and that fail. On the 
surface, bond amount and district enrollment appear to show that 
larger bonds pass for schools with higher enrollment. However, 
when we control for district enrollment by instead looking at 
bond dollar per student enrolled in the district, the picture 
changes (row 3). Overall, asking for more money per student 
appears to correspond with failing bonds. Districts with failed 
bond elections asked for more money per student ($9,392.54) 
than districts with successful elections ($7,961.19). 
 
Looking at the other variables allows us to construct a broader 
profile of school districts that pass or fail bond elections. Districts 
in which voters passed bond elections had a lower average 
percentage of students receiving federally subsidized free lunches 
(22.5% compared to 18.6%). They had, on average, a slightly 
lower percentage of the local population that had only a high 
school degree (30.7% compared to 33.5%). They had, on average, 
a lower voter turnout (22.4% compared to 26.8%). They held 
their bond elections later in the calendar year by an average of 20 
days. They put the school bond request, on average, higher up the 
ballot, either as the only issue up for vote or as an issue voters 
reached before turning to subsequent issues on the same ballot. 
The further down the ballot, the more bond requests failed. 
However, perhaps the most intriguing finding is that districts in 
which voters passed bond elections had more than double the 
average amount of debt ($25.1 million) than districts in which 
voters rejected school bond elections ($10.5 million). Districts 
with more outstanding debt from previous spending passed more 
school bond elections for future spending. 
 
Though the variable is not included in table 2, we also analyzed 
whether having wording relating to “technology” in the text of the 
bond proposal was related to bond passage or failure. Our sample 
contained 793 bonds (73.1%) with technology wording. Of the 
394 bonds that passed, 296 (75.1%) of them contained wording 
pertaining to technology. Of the 399 bonds that failed, 279 
(70.0%) of them contained wording pertaining to technology. 
 
Our study looks at a wide range of variables with interesting, and 
in some cases surprising, results. Some appear to confirm 
findings from prior research discussed earlier, while others do 
not. In order to draw firmer conclusions using Michigan school 
bond elections 1998-2006, it is necessary to control for each 
variable in a logistic regression equation and model the chances 
of passing a bond. Which variables are significant and in what 
directions? This will aid in model building, testing/building 
theory, and helping administrators understand what variables 
were significant for the likelihood of passing a bond in Michigan 
from 1998-2006. 
 
Logistic Regression Models 
 
To estimate the likelihood of passing a bond to finance school 
facilities in Michigan from 1998-2006, we coded all bond 
elections as either passing or failing and calculated a logistic 
regression with bond passage as the estimated outcome. We 
report three different but cumulative models. 
 
Model A replicates the previous study by Bowers, Metzger and 
Militello (2010), expanded to cover 1998-2006. The estimated 
parameters for Model A have the same direction, significance, 
and similar variance explained as the previous findings 
(summarized above). This model used two locale categories (rural 
and small town) with one reference group, mid-sized 
city/suburban. Mid-sized city, with the least number of bonds 
floated over this time period, by itself as a locale category, was 
not significant and did not significantly improve the fit of the 
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model, so we combined it with suburban as the reference group in 
order to estimate a more parsimonious model (data not shown). 
 
Table 3: Logistic regression model estimation of passing a 
Michigan school district facilities bond, 1998-2006. 
    
 Model A Model B Model C 
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Percent Pop with  





Long Term Debt  
  (in Millions $) 
  0.012** 
(0.004) 
Percent Voter  
  Turnout 
  -0.027** 
(0.009) 
Election Day  
  of the Year 
  0.003*** 
(0.001) 
Proposal Ballot  
  Number 
  -0.938*** 
(0.163) 
Technology   0.011 
(0.200) 
    
N 789 789 781 
Goodness-of-fit    
-2 Log Likelihood 1045.373 1028.044 923.763 
Cox and Snell R2 0.061 0.081 0.184 
Nagelkerke R2 0.081 0.109 0.246 
Note: Parameter estimates are listed with standard errors in 
parentheses 
Note: ~p≤0.1; *p≤ 0.05; **p≤0.01; ***p≤0.001 
 
Model B builds on the first model and adds two variables relating 
to community characteristics – a representation of families in 
poverty (percent free lunch) as well as a general proxy of 
educational attainment. Percent free lunch is significant and 
negative. Percent population with only a high school degree is 
significant and negative. District enrollment, which was 
marginally significant in Model A, becomes non-significant in 
Model B. Nonetheless, adding two community-level variables 
increases the estimated variance explained. Model B explains 
about 10% of the variance of the likelihood of passing a facilities 
bond in Michigan between 1998 and 2006 and is a significant 
improvement in fit over Model A, χ2(2) = 17.329, p<0.005. 
 
Model C, as our final model, builds on model B with bond-level 
variables that we drew from the prior literature. Controlling for 
the conditional nature of floating and refloating a bond as well as 
the other variables, we see many intriguing factors (see Table 3). 
 Amount of the bond is negative and significant, implying that 
as the amount of the bond goes up the chances of passing go 
down. 
 District enrollment is not significant (as in Model B), which is 
what would be expected based on the prior research. 
 In terms of district locale (using mid-sized city/suburban as 
the reference group), the results for small towns and rural are 
negative and significant. On the whole, these districts have 
lower chances of passing a school bond. 
 For percent free lunch students, the result is negative and 
significant. As our proxy for students in poverty goes up, the 
chances of passing go down. 
 For percent population with only a high school degree, the 
result is also negative and significant. As our proxy for 
community level of basic educational attainment goes up, the 
chances of passing go down. 
 District long-term debt is positive and significant factor: the 
higher the debt at the beginning of the fiscal year, the better 
the chances of passing the bond. 
 Voter turnout is a negative and significant factor: the higher 
the turnout, the lower the chances of passing. 
 As for the day of the year on which the election is held, the 
result is positive and significant: the later in the calendar year 
the bond election is held, the better the chances of passing. 
 Regarding the proposal number of the ballot, the result is 
negative and significant: the further down the ballot for the 
voter, the worse the chances of passing. 
 The inclusion of technology wording in the ballot text is not 
statistically significant. 
 
Overall, Model C is a significant improvement in fit over Model 
B, χ2(2) = 104.281, p<0.005, and explains about 20% of the 
variance in the likelihood of passing a facilities bond in Michigan 
between 1998 and 2006. This doubles the amount of variance 
explained in all other recent prior research studies. 
 
Visualizing and Interpreting the Final Model of Bond Passage 
 
Since logistic regression coefficients and logit estimates are 
inherently difficult to interpret, plotting representative data is 
recommended (Singer and Willet, 2003). To aid in interpreting 
Model C, the logistic regression model was estimated for each 
bond in the dataset. Logits were then converted to estimated 
probabilities for passing a bond in Michigan from 1998-2006, 
from 0 to 1. Fitted lines for each of the three locale categories 
were then plotted for the estimated probabilities of passing a bond 
in Michigan, 1998-2006, against each of the significant new 
variables in Model C. Figure 1 visualizes the different patterns of 
estimated likelihood of passing a bond for the different locales 
across each of the different variables. In all cases, when we report 










Figure 1: Logistic regression estimated probabilities of bond passage, plotted by significant variables in the logistic 
regression and disaggregated by locale. Probabilities for bond passage were estimated for each of the 789 Michigan school 
district facilities bonds, from 1998-2006. Fitted lines were then plotted for each of the three locale categories across the six 
different variables indicated in the panels, A-F. To help prevent  over-extrapolation, fitted lines extend only for the range for 
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Overall, mid-sized cities/suburban districts had the best chances 
of passing a bond, followed by rural districts, with small town 
district bonds experiencing the worst chances (see Figure 1). 
However, when we look more closely at individual variables, the 
picture becomes more complex. The greater the percentage of 
students enrolled in a school district who receive federally 
subsidized free lunch, the less likely a district was to pass a bond 
(Figure 1A). This negative effect was strongest for small towns. If 
the district’s percentage of free lunch students was above 20%, 
the estimated chances of passing a bond were below 50%. For all 
locales increased long-term debt for the district was positively 
related to the chances of passing a bond, and the effect was 
strongest for small towns (Figure 1B). The percentage of the local 
population 18 or older with only a high school degree negatively 
influenced the estimated chances of passing a bond for all district 
locales – though somewhat more so for small towns (Figure 1C). 
The calendar date on which the election is held appears to have 
been consistently positively related to election outcomes for all 
locales, with bonds floated later in the year passing more 
frequently (Figure 1D). The percentage of voter turnout was 
negatively associated with the estimated likelihood of passing a 
bond (Figure 1E). The number of the bond request on the election 
ballot was highly negatively and significantly associated with 
bond passage (Figure 1F). The further down on a ballot, the lower 
the chances of passing – and this relationship appears to be 




A Model of School Bond Passage for the 21st Century 
 
On the surface, there appears to be even odds of a school district 
getting a facilities bond request passed by local voters. Using the 
case of Michigan, of the 793 bond elections held between 
January, 1998, and December, 2006, 394 (49.7%) passed and 399 
(50.3%) failed. However, attributing this to what amounts to a 
coin toss is hardly satisfying for school district leaders who need 
to find ways to fund the construction and renovation of school 
facilities. It is the obligation of educational policy research to 
produce both theory and association models for explaining the 
outcome of school bond elections. Given the pervasive inequity in 
school facilities and capital expenditures across the U.S. (Brunner 
and Rueben, 2001; Filardo, Vincent, Sung, and Stein, 2006; 
McPhail-Wilcox and King, 1986; Sielke, 2001), understanding 
what factors positively and negatively affect the passage of 
school bonds is urgent and timely. 
 
With this in mind, we discuss our findings by way of relevant 
questions relating to school bond passage likelihood that should 
be of interest to educational researchers, policy makers, and 
school district leaders. These questions are addressed through our 
interpretation of our best analytical model (Model C), taking into 
consideration district locale and controlling for the other variables 
in the model. 
 
Do Community Characteristics Matter? 
 
In our interpretation, a community’s poverty level, level of 
education, and capacity for taxing itself all matter. Put simply, 
controlling for other variables in the model, school districts that 
passed a facilities bond request in Michigan 1998–2006 on 
average had fewer poor students, a prior local track record of 
bond passage, and fewer residents with only high school 
diplomas. 
 
Our study finds that as the percentage of students receiving free 
lunches in a district goes up, chances of that district getting a 
bond passed go down. This is what would be expected based on 
prior research (Sielke 1998). It also makes rational, if cold, sense: 
Controlling for everything else, school districts serving more 
economically disadvantaged students are less likely to pass bonds 
as often as other districts. As the percentage of the local 
population with only a high school degree goes up, chances of 
getting a bond passed go down. This appears to replicate prior 
research findings that voter education level is significant (Piele 
and Hall 1973a) – though older data were somewhat disjointed, 
with the direction of the effect differing based on geographical 
location. Our finding is curious, since it may seem plausible that 
more voters possessing a high school diploma would want well-
funded school facilities for the next generation. This is not what 
we see happening in the case of Michigan. Potentially, a higher 
proportion of voters with only a high school diploma could 
represent people who received fewer personal or economic 
benefits from their own educational experience and may feel less 
motivation to pay more for new schools. Additionally, the higher 
the district’s existing debt at the start of the fiscal year, the better 
the chances of getting a bond passed. This is an expected finding 
based on prior research (Sielke 1998; Zimmer and Jones, 2005). 
We suggest that long-term debt is most likely a proxy for a 
district’s “taxability”: If a district has taxed itself in the past to 
improve facilities, it stands to reason that it would be more likely 
to tax itself again. When it comes to bond passage, perhaps past 
performance predicts future performance. 
 
However, we must admit several limitations. The taxability proxy 
could work in the opposite causal direction – it is possible that 
some school district leaders are just particularly savvy at getting 
bonds passed. After all, even when we controlled for the 
requested bond amount, long-term debt was still a positive and 
significant factor. Additionally, our measure of poverty is narrow 
and stringent. Typically researchers use the number of students 
receiving free and reduced lunches as the proxy for poverty, but 
because reduced lunch numbers were not available to us we could 
only use the free lunch measure – and this may actually downplay 
the influence of poverty (which might have an even larger effect 
with a more inclusive measure). Furthermore, we use only a 
partial or preliminary proxy for level of community education, 
based on the Michigan data available to us. It is possible that 
including different measures of educational attainment could alter 
the result. 
 
Do School District Characteristics Matter? 
 
In our interpretation, a district’s locale matters but not enrollment 
size. School districts trying to get a facilities bond request passed 
in Michigan 1998–2006 were less likely to pass their bonds if 
they were located in a rural locale and particularly in small town 
locales, regardless of small or large enrollments. That enrollment 
is non-significant is what should be expected based on most prior 
research (Piele and Hall, 1973a; Sielke, 1998; Zimmer and Jones, 
2005) – though not in the previous study by Bowers, Metzger and 
Militello (2010). Our data here suggest that as we took into 
consideration more community-level parameters over a longer 
time span, enrollment ceased to be a significant factor. Perhaps 
the size of the population is outweighed by important 
characteristics of the population. 
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As in the previous work, this study finds that locale is a 
significant factor. Everything else being equal, rural districts have 
less than middling chances of getting a school bond passed while 
small towns have the worst chances of all. In an earlier study of 
school facilities in Michigan, Militello, Metzger and Bowers 
(2008) observed that districts may ask for increasingly more in 
capital facilities bonds in order to “keep up with the Joneses”. 
Differences in what school districts need and what they can get 
their voters to fund may be influenced by location. Our findings 
in this study suggest that conclusion may apply statewide, based 
on nearly ten years of evidence. 
Do the Details of the Bond Matter? 
 
In our interpretation, the amount requested for the bond and the 
number of times the bond is brought before voters both matter, 
but the inclusion of technology wording does not. School districts 
trying to get a facilities bond request passed in Michigan 1998–
2006 were less likely to pass larger bonds with multiple floats. 
Additionally, in our model, wording pertaining to technology did 
not appear related to bond passage. 
 
Our study finds that the more money a district asks for, the worse 
the chances of getting a bond passed. This is what would be 
expected based on the prior research (Beckham and Maiden, 
2003; Bowers, Metzger and Militello 2010; Piele and Hall, 
1973a; Sielke, 1998; Sielke 2001). It also makes rational sense: 
Everything else being equal, people rarely vote for higher taxes. 
Even when we controlled for current district long-term debt, bond 
amount was still a strongly negative and significant factor. 
Additionally, if a district fails to win a bond election the first 
time, chances fall on the second float. However, after two failed 
attempts, this study confirms previous work in suggesting that it 
may be worth a third try (Bowers, Metzger and Militello 2010). 
Furthermore, our study indicates that for Michigan by the late 
1990s and 2000s, bond passage was not significantly related to 
the inclusion of wording pertaining to technology in the bond’s 
ballot language, even though over 70% of all of the bonds 
examined contained technology wording. In contrast to this 
finding, Beckham and Maiden (2003) found that technology 
wording was a significant predictor of bond passage in 
Oklahoma. For the context of Michigan over this time-period, it 
may be that school districts were in need of technology upgrades 
to such an extent that inclusion of technology did not have an 
impact on bond passage. However, just as likely, this contrasting 
result could be due to geographical or regional political 
differences on the need for technology in schools. This finding 
points to interesting avenues for future research in the domain of 
funding for technology in school facilities funding requests. 
 
Do the Details of the Election Matter? 
 
In our interpretation, the time during a calendar year that a bond 
election is held, the position of the bond proposal on the ballot, 
and voter turnout all matter. School districts trying to get a 
facilities bond request passed in Michigan 1998–2006 were more 
likely to pass a bond when the election was held later in the year, 
the bond issue was at the top of the ballot, and the district 
experienced low voter turnout. 
 
As in prior research (Johnson, 2008; Piele and Hall, 1973a), our 
study finds that higher voter turnout results in lower chances of 
getting a bond passed. Conventional wisdom is that small turnout 
consists mostly of yes-voting activists and that their influence is 
watered down as more voters come to the polls. Our study 
strongly suggests that this conventional wisdom may be right. In 
addition, school district leaders are rightly interested in what time 
of year is best to ask voters to fund facilities construction 
(Johnson, 2008). Our study finds that, controlling for the other 
variables in the model, for districts that floated bonds later in the 
year, those bonds passed more often. Possibly the early part of the 
year is a problematic time to ask voters for more money because 
tax bills are due, personal debt may be higher due to holiday 
spending, and the weather can be inclement (in Michigan heavy 
snows are often seen as late as early April, although they can also 
come as early as late October). What is particularly interesting is 
that, even controlling for voter turnout, holding the election later 
in the year is positive and significant. Potentially, around the 
beginning of a new school year, voters have school on their minds 
and may be more likely to say yes to new facilities construction. 
However, we must stress that caution must be taken when 
interpreting these findings. Our findings do not point to causal 
relationships, but rather we provide findings only from an 
association model of bond passage. 
 
In a previous study Bowers, Metzger and Militello (2010) noted 
that school district leaders sometimes break up facilities funding 
requests into a number of smaller proposals on the same ballot 
instead of one omnibus proposal. The previous study asked but 
was unable to address whether or not doing so is a successful 
strategy. This study suggests that bond requests which are the 
first or only issue on the ballot have the best associated chances 
of passing. However, this variable is problematic because it is 
only a measure of bond position on the ballot and may not take 
into consideration the total number of issues on the ballot 
(including elected offices, other municipal facilities, referenda, 
etc.). Nonetheless, it may be reasonable that facilities bond 
requests that are the first or only issue have the best chances 
because there are fewer (or no) other issues to distract voter 
attention. After all, even controlling for voter turnout, being 
further down the ballot lowers the chances. It is possible that 
voters get “issue fatigue” when school bond proposals are among 
many others. 
 
CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
We conclude that many factors influencing school bond passage 
identified in research literature from the late 20th century still 
hold for the case of Michigan, 1998–2006. More students in 
poverty, higher voter turnout, and larger bond amounts all are 
associated with lower chances of getting a bond request passed. 
On the other hand, some significant factors are new and 
interesting. Holding the election later in the calendar year and 
having the bond proposal as the first or only issue on the ballot 
are associated with higher chances of passing a school facilities 
bond. Our most important conclusion is that district locale 
matters. This is the fourth recent study concluding that type of 
locale – mid-sized city/suburban, small town, or rural – is a major 
influence on school facilities funding in Michigan (Bowers, 
Metzger and Militello 2010; Militello, Metzger and Bowers 2008, 
Zimmer and Jones, 2005). 
 
It is necessary to stress that this study is not a prescription for 
how to win a school bond election. What held for Michigan over 
the past 10 years may not be generalizable to all school districts 
in Michigan or any other state. Our chief purpose is to help to 
build an updated model of bond passage likelihood in the hopes 
of constructing a broader theory. While considerable scholarly 
investigation was conducted in the 1960s–70s (Piele and Hall 
10 
 
Bowers, Metzger & Militello (2010) Knowing the Odds 
 
1973a, 1973b), school bond passage has received less attention by 
policy researchers in recent decades. What is needed is a 
theoretical model that takes into consideration the variables tested 
in the past and updates them for the 21st century. We hope that 
our final model in this study lays groundwork for developing such 
a 21st-century knowledge base on school bond election outcomes. 
 
Future research is necessary to construct a broader theory of bond 
passage. First, further investigation is needed to distinguish 
effects for mid-sized cities (like Lansing, Kalamazoo, or Flint in 
Michigan) from suburban districts as well as to account for large 
cities (Detroit, for example). Second, more research is needed on 
different strategies for bond proposals on a ballot. Our study only 
could examine whether or not the bond proposal was the first or 
only issue on the ballot. The influence of where the bond proposal 
is positioned among the known total number of issues on the 
ballot – and what those other issues are – remains to be studied. 
Third, this study does not address how or why each of the 
significant variables in the model act in districts attempting to 
pass bonds. Future qualitative research is needed to describe and 
understand the complex work and interrelationships of district 
and community actors during the bond proposal and election 
phases. Finally, replication is essential in building a general 
theory. In this study we hypothesize that certain factors seem to 
matter in getting school facilities bonds passed, but replication of 
findings and additional analysis is necessary before generalized 
claims can be made across time and different geographic 
contexts. 
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